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STATE TAXATION OF INCOME EARNED BEYOND ITS
BORDERS: ALLOCATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF
UNITARY BUSINESS INCOME IN FLORIDA
FRED F. HARRIS, JR.*
Before 1972, the Florida constitution prohibited the levy of an
income tax upon any of its citizens.' Faced with a projected two
hundred fifty million dollar deficit in revenue and required by law
to operate within a balanced budget,2 Governor Reubin Askew
called a special session of the Florida Legislature and requested a
constitutional amendment allowing an income tax on corpora-
tions.3 Upon passage and ratification of that amendment, Florida
entered the arena of unitary business taxation.'
Although legislation implementing this constitutional amend-
ment has existed now for several years, Florida law on the taxation
of multistate businesses is in many respects unclear. There have
been few judicial opinions interpreting the statutory provisions
and the regulations promulgated under their authority. Moreover,
the regulations and the Department of Revenue's interpretations
of them often vary from taxation methods used in other states, re-
sulting in inconsistent tax liabilities for businesses operating inter-
state. This article will analyze the unitary business concept and
the effects of its inconsistent application on multistate businesses.
THE UNITARY BUSINESS CONCEPT
The term "unitary business" is best defined as
a business, the component parts of which are too closely con-
nected and necessary to each other to justify division or separate
consideration, as independent units. By contrast, a dual or multi-
form business must show units of a substantial separateness and
completeness, such as might be maintained as an independent
business . . ., and [the units must be] capable of producing a
profit in and of themselves.5
* B.A. 1975, Auburn University; J.D. 1977, Stetson University; LL.M. 1979, University of
Florida. Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1968, amended 1972).
2. Id. § l(d).
3. Note, Defining a Fair Share: The Proposed Revision to Florida's Corporate Profits
Tax, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1029, 1034-35 (1978).
4. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(b). The legislature enacted implementing legislation to be
effective July 1, 1971; ch. 71-359, § 19, 1971 Fla. Laws 1827 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 214,
part IV (1979)).
5. Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 168 S.E. 397, 399 (N.C. 1933), afJ'd per curiam, 291
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The distinction between unitary and nonunitary businesses be-
comes important when a business operates in more than one state.
In the case of a unitary business (i.e. one whose operations in the
separate states are dependent upon and contribute to each other),
a state must allocate the business' total taxable income so that it
taxes only an amount proportionate to the income-producing con-
tributions of the business operations in that state. When the busi-
ness is nonunitary, the state simply taxes the income produced by
the unit or units of the business operating in the state.'
Taxation of multistate businesses by the states is subject to con-
stitutional limitations. These restrictions are based upon the juris-
dictional concept that a state may not tax income earned outside
its borders.7 The commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion grants exclusive power to Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce and requires that interstate commerce be free from any di-
rect restrictions or impositions by the states.8 The due process
clause as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment
also prohibits states from engaging in extraterritorial taxation be-
cause there is no nexus between such a tax and the local transac-
tions for which the tax is imposed.9 As Justice Holmes stated in
Wallace v. Hines:
The only reason for allowing a state to look beyond its bor-
ders when it taxes the property of foreign corporations is that it
may get the true value of the things within it, when they are part
U.S. 642 (1934). See also Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942) (three unities
test-requires unity of ownership, operation, and use); Edison Cal. Stores Inc. v. McColgan,
183 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947) (if the portion of business done within the state is dependent
upon or contributes to the operation of business without the state, the operations are uni-
tary); Commonwealth v. ACF Indus. Inc., 271 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1970) (nonunitary business
activity exists where two separate and segregated enterprises are not related to each other
and are conducted as separate and independent units).
6. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Complete Auto
Transit Inc. v. Grady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
7. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959): "[The Commerce Clause precludes
the states from imposing] a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce either by
providing a direct commercial advantage to local business, . . . or by subjecting interstate
commerce to the burden of 'multiple taxation'." (citations omitted).
9. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461 (1959);
Morewood Realty Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 A.2d 219, 222 (Pa. 1972): "'[A]pplication to
the states of the rule of due process arises from the fact' that their spheres of activity are
enforced and protected by the Constitution, and, therefore, it is impossible for one state to
reach out and tax property in another without violating the Constitution." (quoting Wheel-
ing Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209 (1936)).
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of an organic system of wide extent, that gives them a value
above what they otherwise would possess. The purpose is not to
expose the heel of the system to a mortal dart-not, in other
words, to open to taxation what is not within the State. 10
Although constitutional restrictions appear equitable, large mul-
tistate enterprises-later to be known as unitary businesses' '-for
many years exploited the federal restrictions to avoid state income
taxation. In the typical situation an integrated, multistate business
would locate its manufacturing, wholesale, and retail operations in
different states; then, prices charged by each division were artifi-
cially manipulated so that the division in the state with the lowest
tax rate was assigned all the profits of the business.' 2 Eugene Cor-
rigan, executive director of the Multistate Tax Commission, listed
four other conimon devices for avoiding state taxation:
(1) [A]ttributing income to a state that does not have jurisdic-
tion to tax that income;
(2) inconsistently attributing sales, property, and payroll in the
numerators of the respective factors of the apportionment
formula;
(3) inconsistently differentiating between "business" and "non-
business" income; and
(4) utilizing a multiple corporate structure to shield unitary bus-
iness income from taxation.1'
By 1920, methods of tax avoidance had become so prevalent that
Justice Brandeis, in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
noted that a state "attempting to put upon [a] business its fair
share of the burden of taxation was faced with the impossibility of
allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes con-
ducted within its borders.' 4
To halt this loss of revenue, the states devised and the courts
approved a system of formulary apportionment whereby each state
multiplies the total income of a unitary business by the amount
the local segment contributes to the final realization of profit.1 5 To
10. 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
11. See Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
12. See generally Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions
and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423 (1976).
13. Id. at 429-30.
14. 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920).
15. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897). Other systems were also devised,
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accurately determine contribution, factors such as property, pay-
roll, and sales of the in-state segment are compared with identical
factors of the total integrated business. The percentage of these
factors located within the state is assumed to be the amount that
that division contributes to the total income earned by the unitary
business, and the state imposes a tax according to that ratio.
Although this system of allocation may accurately reflect the in-
come of a segment of a multistate business, its application is re-
stricted to businesses which are in fact unitary. As early as 1897
the Supreme Court provided guidelines for determining unity. In
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, the Court held:
[Wihile the unity which exists may not be a physical unity, it is
something more than a mere unity of ownership. It is a unity of
use, not simply for the convenience or pecuniary profit of the
owner, but existing in the very necessities of the case-resulting
from the very nature of the business. 16
Regrettably, the Supreme Court definitions of a unitary business
do not specifically delineate factors within a corporate framework
which are determinative of unitary status, although certain attrib-
utes, such as central purchasing, have been held indicative of suffi-
cient corporate integration to warrant unitary status. 7 Florida's
apportionment statute does not define "unitary business,"'18 but
the regulations promulgated by its authority broadly construe the
phrase.' 9 These regulations are modeled after those of the Multi-
state Tax Compact. Before discussing the Florida regulations, it
will be helpful to explain the significance of the Multistate Tax
Compact.
In 1964 a congressional subcommittee published a comprehen-
sive report on state taxation of interstate business known as the
Willis Report.20 This report criticized the diversity in state appor-
tionment formulas and recommended a federal allocation plan us-
but this is the most prevalent.
16. 165 U.S. 194, 222 (1897); accord, Standard Oil Co. v. Thoreson, 29 F.2d 708, 711 (8th
Cir. 1928).
17. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 505 (1942).
18. FLA. STAT. § 214.71 (1979).
19. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12C-1.15(4)(a).
20. SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No.
1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (vols. 1 & 2); H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) (vol. 3); H.R. REP. No. 952, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965) (vol. 4) [hereinafter cited as
WILLIS REPORT].
[Vol. 8:21
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ing a two-factor (property and payroll) formula. The report sug-
gested that differences among the state systems created the
possibility of haphazard taxation, required additional recordkeep-
ing and a concomitant increase in costs for business, and generated
taxpayer disrespect for the laws which, in turn, led to mass non-
compliance. 21 This, coupled with past judicial requests for federal
intervention,22  prompted the states to attempt to police
themselves.
The result of the states' initiative was the Multistate Tax Com-
pact (MTC), which went into effect August 4, 1967. Its stated
objectives were to:
1. Facilitate proper determination of state and local tax liability
of multistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment of
tax bases and settlement of apportionment disputes.
2. Promote uniformity or compatibility in significant compo-
nents of tax systems.
3. Facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing
of tax returns and in other phases of tax administration.
4. Avoid duplicative taxation. 3
The constitutionality of the MTC was recently upheld by the Su-
preme Court in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Com
mission against charges that it violated the compact clause of the
United States Constitution.2 4
21. See generally id. at vol. 4, 1121-28.
22. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476-77 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional
policy. . . .Congress alone can formulate policies founded upon economic realities, perhaps
to be applied to the myriad situation involved by a properly constituted and duly informed
administrative agency."); International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340, 360 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292, 306-07 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309
U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (dissenting opinion); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307,
327 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Celler, The Development of a Congressional Pro-
gram Dealing with State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 385, 389-
90 (1968) (citing four major defects in allowing each state to formulate its own policy: (1)
nonenforcement and noncompliance; (2) overtaxation; (3) local business getting an unfair
advantage; and (4) poor attitude generated, resulting in a disrespect for the laws).
23. Tax Administration-Multistate Tax Compact, STATE TAX GUIDE-ALL STATES
(CCH) 35 (Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ALL STATES]. The MTC is presently in use in 19
states. Id.
24. 434 U.S. 452 (1978). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 provides "No State shall, without
the Consent of Congress, . . .enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State
19801
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Florida became a member of the MTC in 1967,5 but withdrew
five years later to implement its own allocation scheme." Although
Florida is no longer a member state, its regulations were lifted al-
most verbatim from the MTC, so that Florida's evolving position
on the taxation of unitary businesses is revealed by noting the
changes and omissions in Florida's regulations as compared with
those of the MTC. The starting point for this comparison is the
definition of unitary businesses. The Florida regulations state
broadly that, a strong presumption is created by the presence of
any of the following factors: (1) when all of the corporation's activ-
ities are in the same general line; (2) when its various divisions or
segments are engaged in different steps in a large vertically struc-
tured enterprise; or (3) where there is strong centralized
management.2
7
OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION
A group of tax scholars, led by Jerome Hellerstein, argues that a
definition of unity such as that found in Florida's regulations is too
broad, and that businesses should be treated as unitary only if
their divisions operating in different states are operationally inte-
grated.28 Operational unities are typified by integrated manufac-
turing, wholesaling, retailing, central purchasing, and other related
features.29 They contrast operational activities with ownership-re-
lated entrepreneurial activities such as investment, borrowing of
capital funds, purchasing business insurance, and requiring
financial reports from each owned business."
Authority for this position, although scarce, comes in part from
the Supreme Court, which held in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio
State Auditor that "[wihile the unity which exists may not be a
25. Ch. 67-598, §§ 1, 5, 1967 Fla. Laws 1733 (repealed 1971) (enacted to "simplify tax-
payer compliance, eliminate the possibility of double taxation, prevent disputes or minimize
their number between member states").
26. Ch. 71-980, § 1, 1972 Fla. Laws 51 (repealing articles III & IV of the MTC); ch. 76-
149, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 259 (repealing all other MTC articles).
27. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12C-1.15(4)(a)(1)-(3).
28. See generally Hellerstein, The Unitary Business Principle and Multicorporate En-
terprises: An Examination of the Major Controversies, 27 TAX EXECUTVE 313, 322 (1975).
29. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942) (holding that central
purchasing demonstrates that "functionally the various branches are closely integrated").
30. The operational integration theory was argued by taxpayers in Associated Dry Goods
Corp. v. Department of Revenue, No. 78-1083, 78-1259 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County 1978),
aff'd mem., 373 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The circuit court rejected the
taxpayers' reasoning and found the business to be unitary. Id.
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UNITARY BUSINESS INCOME
physical unity, it is something more than a mere unity of owner-
ship. It is a unity of use. . . . "-1 Because the Supreme Court in
Adams Express did not delineate those factors within a corporate
framework which would be determinative of unitary status, much
controversy and uncertainty remained.32 Later, however, the Court
cast doubt upon the operational integration theory in Butler
Brothers v. McColgan by announcing that in order for a business
to be deemed unitary, it must fulfill the requirements of a three-
part test: there must be a unity of operation, ownership, and use. 8
Despite this setback, Hellerstein believes, as does this author,
that the operational integration test should be adopted. He states
that "[t]he underlying reason for the development of formulary ap-
portionment [is] that there is no viable way of separately account-
ing for the profits of a business where interdependent operating
functions that produce the profits of the enterprise are carried on
in more than one state." ' As to nonoperating activities, Heller-
stein concludes that even if centralized, they ought not necessitate
the use of formulary apportionment:
The point is that such matters require a spreading of costs which
can be acceptably accomplished by distributing charges on a time,
or a gross volume basis, or by other workable methods, and do
not involve the elusive effort to segregate the profits between in-
terdependent steps in operations....
Consequently, the nonoperating functions of an enterprise.
although centralized, ought not lay the basis for holding the en-
terprise unitary.38
31. 165 U.S. 194, 222 (1897).
32. But see Boren, Separate Accounting in California and Uniformity in Apportioning
Corporate Income, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 478, 499-507 (1971), for a list of factors stated to be
indicative.
33. 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942). This is the so-called "three unities test," defining the neces-
sary composition of a business which is unitary; the test must be distinguished from the
three-factor (payroll, property, and sales) formula used in many apportionment schemes.
But see Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS
L.J. 42, 47 (1960) (where the three-unities test of Butler is criticized as being at best ambig-
uous, and possibly meaningless).
34. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circum-
scriptiori of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L. TAX J. 487, 500 (1968).
35. Id. at 502; see Keesling & Warren, supra note 37, at 52:
It may well be that in many instances the central performance of certain functions
on behalf of a number of commonly owned series of business activities, which from
an operational standpoint, are separate businesses, may result in savings substan-
tially similar to those just discussed. Before, however, it is concluded that the
different groups of activities should be considered as constituting one business, it
should clearly appear that the savings and advantages are substantial in relation
1980]
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Although operational integration offers a logical basis for deem-
ing a business unitary (and thus subject to income apportionment),
the states would prefer that the courts recognize central-ownership
activities as being indicative of unity in businesses operating in
more than one state. The regulations of both the MTC and Florida
are drawn so broadly that state taxing authorities possess consider-
able discretion in determining corporate tax liabilities. The push
by the states is most vividly demonstrated by statements made by
the drafters of the Uniform Allocation and Apportionment of In-
come Act;"6 for example, Frank Keesling, noted authority on for-
mulary apportionment, stated:
At this point it is questionable whether there is such a thing as a
to the income involved. Central accounting, for instance, may result in some sav-
ings, but in most instances the amount is trifling in comparison with the income of
the various series of business activities for which the accounting is performed.
Alone considered, it is too weak a connecting link to bind into one business, what
would otherwise, from an operational standpoint, be considered separate busi-
nesses. Similar observations may be made with respect to other centrally per-
formed functions such as management, handling of insurance, advertising, and the
purchasing of supplies and equipment.
See also Morewood Realty Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 A.2d 219, 222 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972):
We detect in these cases an on-going purpose on the part of the U.S. Supreme
Court to keep state taxation of multistate corporations within definite bounds. A
different attitude . . . would have a disastrous consequence to our federal system,
and ultimately result in either the inability to govern exemplified by the Articles
of Confederation or fifty separate economies incapable of supporting the needs of
two hundred millions of persons.
Hellerstein has convinced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that he is right. In Common-
wealth v. ACF Indus., Inc. 271 A.2d 273, 280 (Pa. 1970) the court held:
[T]he principles are clear. First, if a multistate business enterprise is conducted in
a way that one, some or all of the business operations outside Pennsylvania are
independent of and do not contribute to the business operations within this state,
the factors attributable to the outside activity may be excluded.
Second, in applying the foregoing principle to a particular case, we must focus
upon the relationship between the Pennsylvania activity and the outside one,
not the common relationships between these and the central corporate structure.
Only if the impact of the latter on the operating units or activities is so pervasive
as to negate any claim that they function independently from each other do we
deny exclusion in this context.
(emphasis added).
36. The Uniform Allocation and Apportionment of Income Act was a uniform law sub-
mitted as a preliminary draft to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1956. See generally Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate
Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 84 (1957). For
the text of the draft, see id. at 100 app. The draft was adopted in substantially the same
form and renamed the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act by the NCCUSL
in 1957. See generally Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1958).
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non-unitary business. . . . The view that all income from com-
monly owned business activities should be combined and appor-
tioned by a single formula without inquiring as to whether such
activities are unitary or separate in nature seems
preferable. .... 37
This move by the states has not been limited significantly by the
courts. Business, once the perpetrator of tax abuses in this area, is
now being subjected to a sophisticated attack by the states. The
real burden, however, is upon those smaller businesses that cannot
afford the substantial costs of compliance (e.g., increased record-
keeping). It seems that the pendulum has now swung: The past
abuses of multistate businesses in avoiding state income tax are
coming full circle, with the states insisting upon expanding the
definition of a unitary business. Florida appears willing to continue
this trend.
Florida's regulations do not recognize a distinction between op-
erational and nonoperational aspects of a corporation's structure.
Florida regulation 12C-1.15(4)(a)(3) provides that "[a] taxpayer
which might otherwise be considered as engaged in more than one
trade or business is properly considered as engaged in a unitary
business when there is a strong central management, coupled with
the existence of centralized departments for such functions as
financing, advertising, research, or purchasing"; 8 additionally, ac-
counting, personnel, insurance, and legal activities may also be
properly considered. 9 This regulation is based on the philosophy
that all relevant factors are to be considered and that any common
factor is relevant. This is also the stance of the MTC. By its terms
the Florida regulation grants wide latitude to Florida's Depart-
ment of Revenue. For example, in J.L. Malone v. Department of
Revenue, the Department of Revenue, in denying the use of the
statutory apportionment formula, reasoned:
the taxpayer's return of income from projects within the State of
Florida was substantially higher than its rate of income from ac-
tivities in other jurisdictions .... The result, therefore, if formu-
lary apportionment were used would be to apportion certain in-
come actually earned within the State of Florida outside the
37. Corrigan, supra note 12, at 429.
38. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12C-1.15(4)(a)(3). These regulations are similar to those sug-
gested by the Multistate Tax Compact; see M.T.C. art. IV, § 1(b), ALL STATES, supra note
23.
39. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12C-1.15(4)(a)(3).
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State of Florida.'0
As is apparent from this statement, the Department of Revenue in
this instance is basing its determination of the proper accounting
method not on whether the business is unitary, but, rather, on
whether more tax revenue will be generated by applying a specific
type of accounting method to the business. This type of considera-
tion is the product of the broad discretion granted by an expansive
definition of "unitary business" and it demonstrates how such a
broad definition naturally leads to' diversity between the states in
the allocation of corporate income.
Regulation 12C-1.15(4)(a)(1) indicates that if a Florida taxpayer
is engaged in activities which are of one general line or type, a pre-
sumption arises that the business is unitary. The regulation's ex-
ample of a chain of grocery stores indeed describes a unitary busi-
ness; however, the chain of stores should be considered unitary
more properly because of complete central purchasing and other
operational activities, not simply because the divisions all are in-
volved in retail grocery sales."' In Square D Company v. Kentucky
Board of Tax Appeals the court discussed a similar contention,
stating:
The overall operation of related businesses in different states, or
the unity of ownership of stock in separate corporations engaged
in a related or similar business, does not itself create the required
integration of business operations as to justify a state in claiming
a proportionate share of the income from foreign sources."
The court looked to the operational integration of corporate divi-
sions. Basing a determination of unity upon the mere similarity of
businesses is unjustified because the potential for arbitrary, incon-
sistent tax treatment by the states is too great.
Because the regulations so broadly construe the definition of a
unitary business, the true test of unity must emerge from Florida's
courts. The first cases are now reaching the appellate courts, and it
appears the courts are confused. For instance, in Stan Musial &
Biggie's v. Department of Revenue, the Florida First District
Court of Appeal held that even a nonunitary business may be sub-
40. No. 76-648, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Div. of Administrative Hearings Sept. 23, 1976).
41. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. at 508.
42. 415 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Ky. 1967) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8:21
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jected to Florida's apportionment formula."' Despite the inconsis-
tency of other states' decisions on this subject, Stan Musial is the
only case to have questioned the basic requirement of unity before
income earned in other states may be allocated to the taxing juris-
diction." The only other Florida appellate decision came from the
Second District Court of Appeal in Department of Revenue v. As-
sociated Dry Goods Corp." The corporation maintained in the
trial court that because it was integrated with its in-state division
principally in nonoperational aspects, it should be deemed nonuni-
tary. The trial court rejected the corporation's distinction and held
the corporation to be unitary."6 The Second District affirmed, un-
fortunately, without opinion.47
Whatever definition is adopted by the Florida courts, it will find
support from one of the many varying decisions in other jurisdic-
tions. The Supreme Court has admitted that "judicial application
of constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much
room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise
guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensible power of
taxation.' 8 The Oregon Supreme Court hinted at the real issue in
43. 363 So. 2d 375, 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (The corporation, however, came
within an exception to the rule of application of the three-factor formula because it demon-
strated "a unique and nonrecurring situation making utilization of the formula unfair.").
44. But see, H.R. REP. 11798, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), the original proposal of the
Willis Subcommittee, which would have required formula apportionment without regard to
whether the business was "unitary."
45. 373 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
46. No. 78-1083, 78-1259 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County 1978), aff'd mem., 373 So. 2d 466
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
47. 373 So. 2d at 466.
48. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, asked for Congressional intervention, noting:
At best, this Court can only act negatively; it can determine whether a specific
state tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause. Such decisions must
necessarily depend upon the application of rough and ready legal concepts. We
cannot make a detailed inquiry into the incidence of diverse economic burdens in
order to determine the extent to which such burdens conflict with the necessities
of national economic life. Neither can we devise appropriate standards for divid-
ing up national revenue on the basis of more or less abstract principles of consti-
tutional law, which cannot be responsive to the subtleties of the interrelated econ-
omies of Nation and State.
Id. at 476.
Many bills have been introduced providing for federal legislation, although none have
been enacted into law to date. See, S. 2080, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975) (Mathias Bill); S.
1255, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Muskie-Percy Bill); H.R. 1538, 92nd Cong., 1st Seas.
(1971); S. 317, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1965). See
also STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, ALL STATES UNIT (P-H) 5000. These defeats led to the
formation of the Multistate Tax Compact.
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need of resolution when it held:
Every definition of the word "unitary" must of necessity be
general, and since such must be its nature, a repetition of defini-
tions cannot be helpful in the solution of any specific problem. In
determining whether a business is unitary or otherwise in charac-
ter, a knowledge of the facts is essential; in truth, the facts are all
important."
Florida needs a method of weighing the common attributes of
two businesses. Should all common features be considered but
weighted differently, or should some attributes be totally ignored
as irrelevant to a "unitary" determination? The answer should
come from the reason apportionment was first necessary, i.e. to
stop the artificial manipulation of the amount of taxes due by busi-
nesses operating in more than one state. Florida has the opportu-
nity to mold a judicial position based upon reason and tempered
by a historical perspective. Such a position would be a welcome
relief from the past "controversy and confusion. "50
DOUBLE WEIGHTED SALES FACTORS
A substantial difference between the MTC and the Florida allo-
cation regulations-and the one which led to Florida's withdrawal
from the MTC-concerns the weighting of factors in allocation for-
mulas. Florida retained the property, payroll, and sales formula of
the MTC,51 but instead of weighing each factor equally, Florida
assigned a double weight to the sales factor.52
The inclusion of a sales factor in allocation formulas was, at one
time, a subject of controversy among scholars. Economists argued
that income was earned exclusively by capital and labor .5 They
felt that sales, although admittedly a part of the income-producing
process, were only the transfer of equivalent values or mutual ben-
efit, not the creation of income.' The economists felt that the
more the allocation formula mirrored economic reality, the less
business decisions would be dictated by tax considerations and the
49. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Galloway, 154 P.2d 539, 544 (Ore. 1944).
50. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
51. FLA. STAT. § 214.71 (1979); M.T.C. art. IV, § 9, ALL STATES, supra note 23.
52. FLA. STAT. § 220.15(4) (1979).
53. Harriss, Economic Aspects of Interstate Apportionment of Business Income, 37
TAXES 327, 362 (1959).
54. Id.
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more efficient our economy would become 68 This made economic
sense, but was "contrary to tax postulates." 6 It was also politically
unacceptable to marketing states.
The sales factor endured, however, and became part of the Uni-
form Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), 57 al-
though its survival really was a result of compromise between the
manufacturing and marketing states.5" Additionally, the Supreme
Court has recognized the propriety of the sales factor's inclusion in
allocation formulas.5 9
Once the sales factor was included with payroll and property in
the formulas, a dispute arose concerning the situs of the sale. The
marketing states naturally wrote their allocation formulas so that
sales were based on the destination of the goods sold; conversely,
the manufacturing states provided for a sales-by-origin test.60 Bus-
iness, fearing taxation at both ends, wanted uniformity and de-
manded federal intervention. 1 The use of sales-by-origin effec-
tively destroyed any advantage to the marketing states that the
three-factor formula had afforded them, so it is not surprising that
sales-by-destination became the dominant method and has been
adopted by both the MTC and by Florida.2
The Florida method of double weighting of the sales factor is not
a new concept. The 1939 Report of the National Tax Association
on Allocation of Income seriously considered double weighting the
55. See id. at 327. ("The present diversity of state allocation formulas creates avoidable
waste. Businesses are put to compliance costs (and governments to administrative expenses)
which serve no useful purpose for the economy."); accord, Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); WILIS REPORT,
supra note 20, at vol. 4, 1121-28.
56. See generally Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate
Businesses, 20 TAx L. REv. 259, 273-76 (1965).
57. The UDITPA was the forerunner of the MTC and now is embodied in MTC art. IV.
The text of the UDITPA is reprinted in Corporate Income Taxes-Correlator, ALL STATES,
supra note 23, at 1 10,000.
58. Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined, 46 VA.
L. REv. 1257, 126 2 (1960). The UDIPTA was endorsed by the ABA in 1957. Id. at 1263.
59. Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U.S. at 509 ("We cannot say that property, pay-
roll, and sales are inappropriate ingredients of an apportionment formula."). See also Un-
derwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (upholding a single sales factor
apportionment formula).
60. See Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Com-
merce: An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1960).
61. Compare Britton, State Taxation of Extraterritorial Value: Allocation of Sales to
Destination, 46 VA. L. REv. 1160 (1960) (arguing for congressional use of the due process
clause) with Harriss, supra note 53, at 328 (arguing for use of the commerce clause).
62. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12C-1.15(4)(d)4; M.T.C. art. IV, § 16, ALL STATES, supra note
23. See also J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 329 (1969).
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sales factor but rejected the idea because of the wide-scale change
in state laws its implementation would require.63 Scholars have
commented on its theoretical attractiveness, but invariably have
come to the same conclusion as the 1951 Committee on Tax Situs
and Allocation of the National Tax Association, which said: "The
desirability of assigning different weights to these factors . . . was
considered. However, the conclusion was reached that any such
weighting would be no less arbitrary than assigning equal weights
"964
These reports were based upon proposed uniform national for-
mulas. In the case of an individual state, however, the differing
weights may have advantages. The factors reflecting the economy
of the state may be emphasized and the tax revenue from the
formula will correspondingly increase. Florida's double weighting
of its sales factor is advantageous in a number of respects. Since
Florida is essentially a marketing state, the sales factor will be
higher than either the property or payroll elements of out-of-state
unitary businesses operating in-state. As previously noted, the ap-
plication of this formula will extract increased taxes from those
multistate concerns. Additionally, it will put Florida in a stronger
position to persuade industries to relocate within its borders since
the double-weighted sales factor would be to the advantage of
businesses with plants and payrolls in the state.65 The third advan-
tage of the provision is the political impact. It is a "legislator's
dream: a lush source of tax revenue, the burden of which falls
largely upon those who cannot vote him out of office." 6
63. See, Wilkie, A Theoretical Basis for the Allocation of Multi-state Income by Uni-
tary Businesses Under State Corporate Net Income Taxes, 13 TAX EXECUTIVE 157, 165
(1961).
64. Miller, Report of the Committee on Tax Situs and Allocation, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 451, 459 (R. Welch ed. 1951). See
also Wilkie, supra note 63, at 166.
65. See also Comment, Apportionment of Corporate Income to the States for Tax Pur-
poses: Fifty Ways to Lose Your Tax Dollar, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 480, 494 (1978).
66. Id. at 496. See also Britton, Taxation Without Representation Modernized, 46
ABAJ 369 (1960):
The obvious effect of such an apportionment formula [sales allocated to destina-
tion] when applied equally to all taxpayers subject to tax within and without the
state is, broadly stated, to tax politically ineffectual nonresident businesses, on
account of and proportionate to shipments into the state and to exempt home
industry from tax on account of and proportionate to shipments out of state.
Id. (emphasis in original); Peters, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation Redefined
by Supreme Court, 49 J. TAX. 240, 244 (1978) ("Have out of state corporations been made a
target for the implementation of tax policies which satisfy the fiscal and political exigencies
of the states?").
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In 1917, economist T.S. Adams made this observation on alloca-
tion formulas: "What is most needed is a uniform rule. Just what
rule shall be selected is less important than the general adoption of
the same rule by competing jurisdictions. '1 67 Florida's double
weighting adds another version to the multiplicity of already di-
verse state formulas. Even among the states that use equally
weighted three-factor apportionment formulas there are disparities
due to the varying definitions given to identical factors.6 8 The Wil-
lis Report noted that "[flaced with [such] diversity in State laws,
taxpayers often impose their own brand of uniformity."
Although diversity in tax allocation formulas creates the possi-
bility of double taxation, the Supreme Court recently refused to
strike down a formula on account of its diversity alone.7 0 In Moor-
man Manufacturing Co. v. Bair the Court upheld an Iowa appor-
tionment formula that was based solely upon the sales factor.
The effect of this decision is to allow states wide latitude in choos-
ing a method of allocation, and thereby to promote diversity. Al-
though Moorman is consistent with other decisions of the Court, 2
it is surprising for a number of reasons. Most important, in Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia the Supreme Court in-
validated a single-factor sales formula, basing its opinion on the
lack of statutory authority.73 The Court in dicta disparaged the
single-factor formula, stating, "[the use of an apportionment
formula based wholly on the sales factor, in the context of general
use of the three-factor approach, will ordinarily result in multiple
taxation of corporate net income. . . ."' The acceptance of Moor-
man's single-factor sales formula also is curious because the same
67. Adams, The Taxation of Business, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON TAXATION 185, 194 (F. Fairchild ed. 1917). See generally Hellerstein, supra note
28.
68. See Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal,
46 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1102-03 (1960); Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report and
Uniformity in Allocation Practices, 42 J. TAX. 105 (1975) (UDITPA's purpose is being frus-
trated by inconsistent interpretation by the states).
69. WILLIS REPORT, supra note 20, at vol. 4, 1125.
70. There is no federal constitutional prohibition regarding double taxation-witness
subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). The
constitutional problems arise when the tax violates due process, denies equal protection, or
interferes with interstate commerce. See id. at 58.
71. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
72. See, e.g., Bass, Radcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920). But see Hans Rees' Sons v.
North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
73. 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
74. Id. at 559.
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year, in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission,
the Court bent over backwards to uphold the Multistate Tax Com-
pact-the very compact that espouses uniformity in allocation for-
mulas7 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Moorman, recognized
this contradiction:
Today's decision is bound to be regressive. Single-factor formu-
las are relics of the early days of state income taxation. The
three-factor formulas were inevitable improvements and, while
not perfect, reflect more accurately the realities of the business
and tax world. With their almost universal adoption by the
States, the Iowa system's adverse and parochial impact on com-
merce comes vividly into focus. But with its single-factor formula
now upheld by the Court, there is little reason why other states,
perceiving or imagining a similar advantage to local interests, may
not go back to the old ways .7
The Supreme Court has often asked for congressional interven-
tion in state taxation of multistate business, but to date none has
been forthcoming. 7 Many agree that this area is better suited to
federal legislative action than to judicial reaction. Perhaps the
Court is allowing the self-serving diversity on the part of the states
to demonstrate to the Congress that federal legislative action is
imperative.79
Although most commentators agree that uniformity is essential,
the method of achieving this goal is in dispute. While most feel
that federal legislation is the key, the states have maintained a
continuous lobby to halt any efforts in that direction. The MTC
unabashedly admits that one of its major goals is "the desire to
'guard against restrictive federal legislation and other federal ac-
tion which impinges upon the ability of state tax administrators to
carry out the laws of their states effectively.' "8 Conversely, busi-
75. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
76. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 282-83. See also Hartman, supra note 68, at 1104 (This diver-
sity results from the "desire of each state to select a method that is most advantageous,
taxwise, to itself.").
77. See note 22 and accompanying text supra; note 48 supra.
78. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("At best, this Court can only act negatively.... The
problem calls for solution by devising a congressional policy."); Harriss, supra note 53.
79. See Hartman, supra note 68, at 1104. Summarizing the "diversity and complexity of
the system," the WILLIs REPORT, supra note 20, at vol. 1, 249, stated: "The present system
for division of income is on its face overwhelming. It will surprise no one familiar with it
that in practice it works badly."
80. United States Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 487 (White, J., dissent-
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ness has been lobbying for a federal allocation formula."' In fact,
92 of the top 100 major businesses have formed an organization
called the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State
Chambers of Commerce (COST) to "discourage state cooperative
solutions to interstate taxation problems.""2
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that there is no
uniformity in allocation formulas. Florida's formula certainly does
not promote uniformity, and the Moorman decision, allowing each
state to adopt whatever formula best suits its individual economic
interests, makes continued diversity all the more likely.83
THE MTC "SEPARATE BUSINESS" REGULATION
Further comparison of the Florida and MTC regulations indi-
cates that the two differ in still another way. The MTC regulations
carefully explain that where a single taxpayer operates two or more
separate businesses, the allocation formula will not be applied to
those different businesses. The MTC then uses the term "single
trade or business" (as opposed to the Florida term "unitary busi-
ness") to describe a business that is subject to formulary appor-
tionment.8 4 Florida's regulations forego any discussion of the sepa-
rate business concept, simply stating that where the Florida
activities "are a part of a unitary business carried on within and
ing) (citing Ninth Annual Report, Multistate Tax Commission, at 1 (1976)).
81. See, e.g., congressional bills cited supra note 48.
82. Corrigan, supra note 12, at 427, 427 n.4. COST recently exerted its influence by pri-
vately pressuring the federal government to enter a tax treaty with Great Britain prohibit-
ing the combination of income from any enterprise doing business in both Great Britain and
the United States. Tax Convention, not yet ratified, United States-Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, United Kingdom, 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) I 8103A (March 1979). Although the
Senate has not yet done so, ratification of the treaty has been recommended by both the
State Department and President Carter. Id. at 8103DB-2 (Oct. 1979). See Corrigan, supra
note 12, at 441 n.42. This treaty would alter the result of such cases as Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924). (a New York business-privilege tax
imposed on a British corporation doing business in New York, based on a ratio between the
value of corporate assets in New York and the total value of corporate assets was held not
unreasonable, not a violation of due process, and not an unconstitutional burden on foreign
commerce). The Multistate Tax Commission knew of the COST attempt in advance but was
unable to frustrate the effort. Corrigan, supra note 12, at 429. Note, as this article was going
to press, the long awaited tax treaty between the United States and Great Britain was rati-
fied. The tax treaty, as ratified, did not address the combination of income issue. Conven-
tion for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, March 25,
1980, United States-Great Britain, 2 TAX TREATIES II (P-H) 1 89030.
83. But see Keesling & Warren, California's Uniform Division of Income for Tax Pur-
poses Act, 15 UCLA L. REV. 156, 157 (1967) ("The existance of such widespread disparity in
allocation practices is undesirable, but its seriousness has been greatly exaggerated.").
84. M.T.C. art. IV, § l(b), ALL STATES, supra note 23.
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without Florida" three-factor formulary apportionment shall gen-
erally be required.85 Florida then follows the MTC regulations in
explaining the factors to be considered in the determination of
which businesses are unitary.
Florida's refinement of the MTC regulations in this area is both
beneficial to the state and detrimental to those unfamiliar with the
concepts of the unitary business theory. It is best to omit a discus-
sion of separate businesses operated by one taxpayer because such
a regulation can only add to the confusion in existing Florida
law-separate treatment of nonunitary businesses may be inferred
from the very definition of a unitary business. This separate treat-
ment, however, may not be readily apparent to those who are inex-
perienced at trying to determine whether the allocation formula
will apply to their corporations, especially since the definitions of
unitary business are so broad.86
BUSINESS vs. NONBUSINESS INCOME
The MTC regulations devote an entire section to the differences
between business and nonbusiness income, illustrating the dispa-
rate treatment of rental income, capital gains, interest, dividends,
and patent and copyright royalties.8 7 Florida's regulations contain
no reference to such a distinction. Under the MTC, nonbusiness
income (which really means nonunitary business income) may be
allocated to the taxing state only if the property had a situs in that
state at the time of sale or transfer or if the taxpayer had a com-
mercial domicile in the state and was not taxable in the situs state;
the unitary business income must be apportioned according to the
three-factor formula.88 Florida's refusal to include the business/
nonbusiness dichotomy in its regulations is supported by commen-
85. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12C-1.15(4)(a).
86. Moat corporations doing business in more than one state will have tax counsel to
interpret these regulations.
87. M.T.C. art. IV, ALL STATES, supra note 23. For a discussion of the treatment of
rental income, see Edelmann, Should Rented Property be Included in the Property Alloca-
tion Factor?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 185
(R. Welch ed. 1949). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 156 P.2d 81 (Cal. Ct. App.
1945) (holding dividends unallocable because the corporation did not engage in the trading
of stocks or any activity relating to stocks except the receipt and disbursement of
dividends).
88. M.T.C. art. IV, §§ 5-8, ALL STATES, supra note 23. See also Nemeth and Agee, State
Taxation of Multistate Business: Resolution or Stalemate?, 48 TAXES 237, 249 (1970) (dif-
ferences in state distinctions between business and nonbusiness income are a major problem
to uniformity).
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tators who characterize the distinction as unsatisfactory and un-
workable.8 9 Other commentators question whether the MTC regu-
lations, despite their specificity, offer any real assistance in
determining whether income is to be classified as business or non-
business-" In any event, there appears to be a trend away from use
of this distinction, with nine of the forty-six states taxing corporate
income refusing to allow separate accounting for nonbusiness in-
come, thereby treating all income as business income subject to
apportionment.9
COMBINED VS. CONSOLIDATED REPORTING AND MULTIPLE
CORPORATIONS
The MTC regulations include a provision that "nothing in the
regulations shall preclude the use of combined reporting."92 The
Florida regulations are silent on this issue. Combined reporting is
used "to insure that the income of a business conducted partly
within and partly without the taxing state shall be determined and
apportioned in the same manner regardless of whether the busi-
ness is conducted by one corporation or by two or more affiliated
corporations."93 That is, the income of the entire enterprise, re-
gardless of its corporate structure, is still computed as a unit, just
as it would be if the business were under one corporate roof.94
Before combined reporting had been developed, New York at-
tempted to require consolidated returns from an out-of-state par-
ent corporation and its subsidiary operating in that state. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the majority in People ex rel. Studebaker
Corp. v. Gilchrist, refused to allow the state to disregard the sepa-
89. See Glaser, Proposed Solutions to Areas of Conflict in Taxation of Interstate Busi-
ness, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTY-THIRD INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 983, 992 (A.
Reiner ed. 1975) (citing the Ad Hoc Committee on Taxation of Interstate Business). See
generally Nemeth and Agee, supra note 88.
90. Peters, Revised Multistate Tax Commission Regs Define "Business" and "Nonbusi-
ness" Income, 40 J. TAX. 122 (1974).
91. See Comment, supra note 65, at 487; Corrigan, supra note 12, at 435. The nine states
mentioned are Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See ALL STATES, supra note 23, at 1 10,200-10,943. De-
spite this trend these regulations have been upheld in Vermont in F.W. Woolworth v. Com-
missioner, 298 A.2d 839 (Vt. 1972), and in New Jersey in F.W. Woolworth v. Director of Div.
of Tax, 213 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1965). See Corrigan, supra note 12, at 435.
92. M.T.C. art. IV, § 2(b), ALL STATES, supra note 23.
93. Keesling, supra note 68, at 106.
94. Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 17 (Cal. 1947) (allocation "should
apply to incorporated wholly controlled branches or businesses ... located" in other
jurisdictions).
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rate but autonomous corporate entities through its requiring of the
filing of consolidated returns." This decision precipitated the
emergence of combined reporting.96 Consolidated reporting not
only computes the income of all the affiliated corporations as a
unit, but taxes that income as a unit as well.9 7 Combined reporting,
on the other hand, merely combines all the affiliated corporations'
income, disregarding intercompany transactions, and then appor-
tions that income to the in-state segment of the business by the
normal apportionment method.9 8 The decisions upholding the
method of combined reporting are not based on direct statutory
authority, but rather on the implied authority to allocate income of
unitary businesses "whenever activities are partially within and
partially without the state." 99 Florida should therefore have no
trouble using combined reporting to prevent the use of a multiple
corporate structure to frustrate its allocation formula, despite its
absence from the regulations. 100
RELIEF PROVISIONS
The Florida relief provision is to be used "[i]f the apportionment
methods of [sections] 214.71 and 214.72 do not fairly represent the
extent of a taxpayer's tax base attributable to this state . . .,
and is identical to the relief provision of the MTC.10 2 Although
Florida has yet to have an appellate opinion based upon this provi-
95. 155 N.E. 68 (N.Y. 1926).
96. Keesling, supra note 68, at 108.
97. Id.
98. See generally Corrigan, supra note 12, at 441; Keesling, supra note 68. See also
Keesling & Warren, supra note 83, at 174 ("Combined income of all sources is first allocated
to sources within and without the state by the formula method, and the California income is
then apportioned among the corporations which are doing business in California.").
99. Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947); see Zale-Salem,
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 391 P.2d 601, 602 (Ore. 1964) (quoting from Edison Cal. Stores):
The power flows from the authorized method of ascertaining the income attributa-
ble to a taxpayer's activities within the state; and by a parity of reasoning the
authority to pursue the method is present whenever activities are partially within
and partially without the state ... , as in the case of the unitary system, whether
the integral parts of the system are or are not separately incorporated.
But see Interstate Fin. Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Tax, 137 N.W. 2d 38 (Wis. 1965) (wholly
owned subsidiary corporation within a state should not be included in apportionment
formula).
100. For a discussion of an I.R.C. § 482 reallocation approach as a possible alternative to
combined reporting, see generally Miller, State Income Taxation of Multiple Corporations
and Multiple Businesses, 49 TAxEs 102 (1971).
101. FLA. STAT. § 214.73 (1979).
102. M.T.C. art. IV, § 18, ALL STATES, supra note 23.
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sion, it appeared that one was forthcoming in Associated Dry
Goods Corp. v. Department of Revenue.103 In the trial court, Asso-
ciated Dry Goods and its division, Robinson's of Florida, were held
to be engaged in a unitary business. The court, however, applied
the relief provision in favor of Robinson's for the "start up" ex-
penses incurred in establishing Robinson's in the Florida mar-
ket.10' These expenses were held to be extraordinary, in part be-
cause of Associated's typical practice of purchasing already
existing dry goods stores rather than starting its own, as it did with
Robinson's. These expenses were sufficient to offset the income ap-
portioned to Florida from Associated, thereby relieving Robinson's
from liability for the back taxes claimed by the Department of
Revenue.
On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, the Depart-
ment of Revenue argued that when a business is unitary under sec-
tion 214.71, Florida Statutes,05 the income apportioned must fairly
represent the tax base as a matter of law.106 Because the Second
District affirmed the lower court without opinion, the Depart-
ment's restrictive interpretation of the relief provision has not
been expressly rejected by the courts;1 07 it is, however, clearly un-
sound, for such reasoning would render Florida's relief provision
inapplicable to the very situations to which it was designed to ap-
ply, i.e. when the normal apportionment provisions produce an un-
fair result. Decisions from other jurisdictions with identical relief
provisions concur.108 The real issue when the relief provision is
103. 373 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
104. No. 78-1083, 78-1259 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County 1978), aff'd mem., 373 So. 2d
466 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
105. (1979).
106. Initial Brief of Appellants at 10, 373 So. 2d at 466.
107. 373 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff'g mem., No. 78-1083, 78-1259 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Pinellas County 1978). The Department of Revenue has petitioned the Florida Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari.
108. See Tiefel v. Gilligan, 322 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ohio 1973) (The allocation formula
section "does not create a conclusive presumption."); Utah Constr. and Mining Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 465 P.2d 712, 713 (Ore. 1970) ("The policy of the statute and regulations is to
adopt a method which will 'fairly and accurately . . . reflect the net income of the business
done within the state.' "); Hellertown Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 358 A.2d 424, 432 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976) (The relief provision "is only operative when the statutory formula does
not yield an apportionment which 'fairly represents' the extent of the taxpayer's business
activity in Pennsylvania."); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 493 P.2d 632,
635 (Utah 1972) ("We do not construe the statute as limiting the Commission to the use of
the formula in all cases."); F.W. Woolworth v. Commissioner of Taxes, 298 A.2d 839, 845
(Vt. 1972) ("The matter of adjustment of the formula is another matter quite apart from
the constitutional question."); W.R. Arthur & Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 118
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used is whether the results of the apportionment formula are fair.
This is usually a question of fact.109
CONCLUSION
The law of taxation of unitary businesses is inconsistent and
often inequitable. The United States Supreme Court has author-
ized diverse formulas among the states, thereby encouraging the
double taxation of multistate businesses. Florida and other states
have taken advantage of the diversity sanctioned by the Supreme
Court to promote their own interest in maximizing tax revenues. In
addition to increasing revenues, Florida's apportionment formula
encourages industries to establish their primary headquarters
within the state.
The tremendous costs incurred by business as a result of diverse
allocation formulas are making the business lobby increasingly vo-
cal. Although the Supreme Court appears reluctant to take a more
affirmative role in establishing an equitable system of multistate
business taxation, this apparent passivity may disguise a recogni-
tion that the business community's hostility is the most effective
force to prod Congress to legislate in this area. If this perception is
correct, states such as Florida are indirectly contributing to the
pressure on Congress to enact a national, uniform system of taxa-
tion of multistate business which will please the business commu-
nity and remove from the states the power to police themselves.
N.W.2d 168, 170 (Wis. 1962) ("The legislature also recognized that no fixed formula would
fairly fit all the multitudinous types of business."). But see Ducas Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
184 N.E. 77, 78 (N.Y. 1932) (relief provision held "too vague to state a workable rule"). See
also Fuqua Indus. Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 261 So. 2d 410 (Ala. 1972); Anderson,
Clayton & Co. v. DeWitt, 513 P.2d 1357 (Ariz. 1973); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Armold, 518 P.2d
453 (Kan. 1974); Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 A.2d 221
(N.H. 1975).
109. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Ellis, 370 P.2d 224, 226 (Ore. 1962)
("(In some cases the facts may require the use of another method combining features of
both [the apportionment method and the segregated accounting method].").
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